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GENERAL ARTICLE
CHOOSING ONE'S FAMILY: CAN THIE LEGAL
SYSTEM ADDRESS THE BREADTH OF WOMEN'S
CHOICE OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP?
BARBARA J. COX*
INTRODUCTION
When speaking of family, the immediate assumption made in our
society is that one is speaking of the traditional nuclear family. Family
is usually defined as persons related by blood, marriage or adoption and
the traditional nuclear family consists of a husband, a wife and their
children.1 This definition is so accepted that virtually no one, regardless
of political belief or ideology, has felt the need to define the term.'
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A. 1978,
Michigan State University; J.D. 1982, University of Wisconsin. An earlier version of
this Article was originally presented to the Feminism and Legal Theory Conference at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison in July 1987. I am particularly indebted to the
participants of that conference for their insightful suggestions about this Article. I
want to specifically thank Martha Fineman for her encouragement and assistance. Ad-
ditionally I am grateful to Michal Belknap, Cindy Wick, and Sue Patmor for their
valuable assistance and to Mollie Martinek for her unwavering support.
1. M.J. BANE, HERE TO STAY: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
37 (1976). The traditional nuclear family is characterized by independent economic
resources and complete autonomy within the husband-wife, parent-child unit. Yorburg,
The Nuclear Extended Family: An Area of Conceptual Confusion 6 J. COMP. FAM.
STUD. 5, 7 (1975). While the nuclear family is the family unit most protected by West-
ern society and the legal system, the modified nuclear family is also common in indus-
trialized societies. Id. at 12. The modified nuclear family is characterized by indepen-
dent economic resources, nuclear family autonomy, weak kin network influence, and
regular but not daily contact. Id. at 7. The modified extended family is characterized
by nuclear family autonomy but also strong kin network influence where members live
in close physical proximity and physical contact occurs daily. Id. at 8. Rather than the
true extended family with its total economic and psychological interdependence, when
the term traditional extended family is used in this Article, it refers to the modified
nuclear or the modified extended family.
2. But see Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 L. & INEQUAL. J. 1 n.1 (1984);
Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 1135, 1138; Minow,
Forming Underneath Everything That Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 85
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From Catherine MacKinnon 3 to the White House Commission on the
Family,4 family has been assumed to be so clearly defined as to need no
further definition. In researching the definition of family, article after
article made references to "the family" without any attempt by the
author to define the term or even to state that the term was so clear as
to not need definition.
This presumption negates the reality that is encountered by those
who disregard the social and legal definition of family when forming
their intimate relationships. The current legal definition of family sig-
nificantly impacts and harms these people whose families fall outside
the accepted norm. Three years ago, I wrote an article which exten-
sively detailed and analyzed the legal consequences of defining family
to include only the traditional nuclear family.5 Families outside the ac-
cepted definition are denied benefits and protection frequently taken for
granted by the traditional nuclear family. The benefits and protection
received by traditional nuclear families are part of an extensive web of
legal and social supports and privileges. 6 They include the right to live
Wis. L. REv. 819, 825 n.14 (1985).
3. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNs: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 515, 524-525 (1982). From the
context of the article, it is clear that MacKinnon is referring to the patriarchal family.
See infra note 18. But MacKinnon's decision not to define "family" is all the more
conspicuous because of her usual tendency to carefully explain her terms. For example,
see the dedication and notes 1, 2 and 3 of that same article.
4. Dzodin, In What Form Will The American Family Survive: How the White
House Conference Addressed the Question, 3 FAM. ADVOC. 16 (Fall, 1980).
5. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through
Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986).
6. Due to limited space, this Article does not discuss the extension of all tradi-
tional family benefits to alternative families. Exclusion of these benefits from this dis-
cussion is not intended to imply that these benefits should not also be extended to
alternative families. They should be. These benefits include favorable income and in-
heritance tax benefits, eligibility for state and federal entitlement programs, intra-fam-
ily privileges in law suits, and intra-family property and support issues. This discussion
is omitted in part because of preemption issues that arise concerning a municipality's
ability to address these issues. See Cox, supra note 5, at 49. For a discussion of some of
these issues, see Lovas, When is a Family not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation
of Inheritance within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REv. 353 (1987-88);
articles cited in Kondoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility
of a Shared Moral Life, 75 GEo. L.J. 1829, 1833 n.19 (1987); Note, Property Rights
of Same-Sex Couples: Toward A New Definition of Family, 26 J. FAM. L. 357 (1987-
88). Additionally this Article also does not discuss the benefit of suing for loss of con-
sortium, workers' compensation or unemployment compensation even though these ben-
efits have been won on a case-by-case basis by some alternative families. For a discus-
sion of these issues, see Cox, supra note 5, at 40-46. However, the California Supreme
Court has recently denied heterosexual cohabitants the right to bring a cause-of-action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of consortium. Elden v. Sheldon, 46
Cal.3d 267, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582 (1988). For an excellent critique of the
court's decision, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Broussard. 46 Cal. 3d at 279-286,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 262-267, 758 P.2d at 590-595 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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together in single family neighborhoodsJ the right to receive employ-
ment-based benefits such as family health insurance and use of be-
reavement and sick leave for family members' deaths and illnesses,8 the
7. See Cox, supra note 5, at 11-27. Virtually every community in the United
States has enacted zoning ordinances that establish residential neighborhoods restricted
to single families. In Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the Village of Belle Terre's definition of family as individuals re-
lated by blood, marriage or adoption or as two unrelated individuals despite a challenge
by six unrelated individuals that it was unconstitutional. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court
did not address the issue of whether unrelated individuals who were members of alter-
native families could also be excluded under such a zoning ordinance. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 985-90 (1978). Three years later, the Court struck
down an ordinance which excluded a traditional extended family consisting of a grand-
mother, her son, and her two grandsons (who were cousins) from a single-family neigh-
borhood. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court declared the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because it "sliced deeply into the family." Id. at 498.
While the Supreme Court has not been faced with the question of whether alter-
native families can challenge local zoning ordinances that define family so as to exclude
them from single-family neighborhoods, some lower courts have rejected claims by al-
ternative families to a constitutional right to live in these neighborhoods. See New
Jersey v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 379 (N.J. 1979) (Mountain, J., dissenting) and the
cases cited therein. However, many lower courts, since Belle Terre and Moore have
specifically granted alternative families the right to live in single-family neighborhoods
on a state constitutional basis. See Charter Township of Delta v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d
831 (M.I. 1984); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 488 N.E.2d
1240 (N.Y. 1985) (under state constitutional due process clause, use of traditional
family for determining permissive occupancy both over-inclusive and under-inclusive);
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal.3d 123, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436
(1980) (used state constitutional right to privacy to prevent restriction on number of
unrelated individuals who could live in single-family neighborhood). For a further dis-
cussion of this issue, see Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J.
761 (discussing zoning ordinances with family restrictions).
Alternative family members encounter other forms of discrimination in housing as
well. For example, the University of California prohibits unmarried heterosexual, gay,
and lesbian couples from applying for married student housing on its campuses, Thus,
they are denied another benefit regularly extended to the traditional nuclear family.
Los Angeles Times, February 12, 1989, at 26, col. 3.
8. Of all the areas where traditional nuclear families are protected and granted
benefits, the protection and benefits obtained through one's employment tend to be the
most significant, at least of those not requiring major state or federal government pol-
icy changes. Such significant government policy changes would include letting alterna-
tive families file tax returns as a family; changing state laws on marriage, divorce, child
custody and support to recognize alternative families; and treating alternative families
equally to traditional nuclear families for the purposes of obtaining government
benefits.
Perhaps the best way to establish the breadth of employment-based benefits that
traditional nuclear families receive and that alternative families do not receive is to
quote from Teresa Friend and Pamela Liberty's pamphlet on obtaining employment
benefits for gay and lesbian couples:
Maria and Ellen have been together for eight years. They live together and
share expenses. Three years ago, when Maria was transferred to San Fran-
cisco, Ellen left her job in Chicago to accompany her. A few months ago,
Ellen was inseminated and the couple are [sic] expecting a child in about
1989]
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right to visit family members in hospitals and authorize their medical
treatment in emergencies, 9 and the right to receive discounted family
three months. Maria is an accountant for a medium-sized San Francisco
firm. Ellen works part-time as a librarian for a local community college.
Because Ellen works part-time, she does not receive any of the medical or
dental benefits provided to full-time employees of the library. Like all same-
sex couples, Maria and Ellen cannot marry, though they would if they
could.
Maria wants to cover Ellen as her dependent on her employer's health
and dental care plan. When the baby is born, Maria will also want coverage
to extend to him or her. Further, since her progressive San Francisco firm
offers both paternity and maternity-or "parenting"-leave, she wants some
time off when the baby comes. Her company (not that progressive, after all)
has denied all of these requests.
Ellen does not get medical benefits from her employer, but she does get
library privileges and a pass to the school's gym for herself and her family.
She has tried to get the school to allow Maria use of those facilities as her
family member, but to no avail.
T. FRIEND & P. LIBERTY, RECOGNIZING LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES: STRATEGIES FOR
EXTENDING EMPLOYMENT BENEFIT COVERAGE 1 (Lesbian Rights Project, San Fran-
cisco, CA 1985).
One characteristic, however, that until very recently applied to all these employer-
sponsored benefit programs, was that they were only provided to members of the tradi-
tional nuclear family. However, some progress has been made in recent years and alter-
native family benefits are now available from a limited number of employers, organiza-
tions, and municipalities. See Cox, supra note 5, at 33-39 for a discussion of some of
the plans currently in effect.
Since my earlier article was published, Santa Cruz, California and the School
District of Berkeley, California have also passed legislation extending benefits to the
domestic partners of their employees. Additionally, the University of California is con-
sidering amendments to its personnel policies. These amendments would allow an em-
ployee to use up to thirty days of sick leave and five days of bereavement leave for the
sickness or death of "any other person for whom there is a familial-like obligation who
is residing in the employee's household." See Memo of Quelda Wilson, Office of the
Assistant Vice Chancellor-Personnel (June 27, 1988). The positive results that will ac-
company this type of benefit extension can be seen from the situation encountered by
the Mayor of Laguna Beach, California, Robert Gentry. Mayor Gentry was also a
University of California employee. When his male partner became ill with AIDS, Gen-
try asked for time off to care for his partner, which was allowed to employees whose
traditional family members were ill. His request was denied. Klien, For Laguna
Beach's Mayor, A Private Grief Goes Public, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 1, 1989, Part V,
at 1, col. 1.
The City Council of Wellington, New Zealand voted unanimously to extend all
benefits to the domestic partners of lesbian and gay bus drivers thus becoming the first
city in New Zealand to do so. LESBIAN CONNECTION, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 7.
9. The "right" to visit one's family members in the hospital and to authorize
their medical treatment if they are unable to do so is perhaps the most emotionally
charged of all the benefits that traditional families receive and alternative families
seek. When people are in the hospital or are unconscious and unable to make treatment
choices themselves, the individuals closest to them are even more important than ever
for providing Support and caring.
Most hospitals allow immediate family members unquestioned access to a hospital-
ized person. Because this visitation is almost universally granted, most traditional fam-
[Vol. 8:299
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memberships from organizations. 10 Thus, the legal system regulates in-
dividuals' choices in defining their family in an attempt by society to
ensure the continued formation of traditional nuclear families and to
exact a price of lost protection and lost benefits from those who live
outside this norm.
Despite the impact that the definition of family has on those who
do not fit that definition, virtually no one, regardless of whether they
support the traditional nuclear family as the only acceptable form of
intimate relationship or whether they present a critique of the legal
system's control of family, even challenges the accepted definition of
family as Ward, June, Wally and the Beaver, plus or minus a few
blood relatives. With the exception of two heterosexuals "cohabitat-
ing," no one addresses the question of whether people can choose who
our families are, except for marriage, and what families based on
choice, and protected by society, would look like.
But family is beginning to attain other definitions that are alterna-
tive to this traditional one. One definition of an alternative family
comes from the Alternative Family Rights Task Force created by the
Madison, Wisconsin Equal Opportunities Commission. Under that defi-
nition, an alternative family is:
Two or more adults, not related by blood, marriage, or adoption,
who are involved in a mutually supportive, committed relationship
and who are voluntarily registered publicly in order to be considered,
under municipal ordinance, as a family, together with their depen-
ily members are not even "aware" that they are receiving a benefit that is denied to
some other people.
Alternative families are denied this right to visit their family members and to
authorize their medical treatment. See Cox, supra note 5, at 46-50 for a fuller discus-
sion of these problems encountered by alternative family members. See also AFTER
YOU'RE OuT 148 (K. Jay & A. Young eds. 1975) (story of one lesbian who visited her
partner in the hospital by telling the nurses that she was her partner's sister) and
K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME?
(1988) (book explaining problems encountered by lesbian when her partner became
severely disabled and she was denied visitation rights by her partner's father).
10. Public accommodations also grant benefits to traditional nuclear families
which are not given to alternative families. Most of these benefits relate to reduced-
price memberships for families. These memberships have a "family" price for two
adults and their children that is less expensive than the rate would be for each family
member to purchase an individual membership. These memberships tend to be in effect
at YMCAs and YWCAs; health or recreational clubs; political, environmental or "is-
sue-oriented" groups; as well as at parks, amusement centers and art centers.
Some of these public accommodations are recognizing the prevalence of alterna-
tive families in society today and have changed their membership policies accordingly.
For example, several have switched from family memberships to household member-
ships in recognition of the fact that a large segment of the population is organized in
household or alternative family groups. This change is a positive recognition of alterna-
tive families and has enabled them to obtain similar benefits to traditional families. See
Cox, supra note 5, at 50-51 for a fuller discussion of this issue.
1989l
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW
dent children.'"
In this Article, this definition will be used when referring to alternative
families. Thus, this definition includes unmarried heterosexual couples,
gay and lesbian couples, and groups of adults and children who have
formed extended families of choice.12
The Madison Equal Opportunities Commission (M.E.O.C.) estab-
lished the Alternative Family Rights Task Force (task force) to study
the desirability and feasibility of enacting an ordinance that would
grant traditional family benefits to alternative families in the areas of
employment-related benefits, single-family housing, family member-
ships in organizations, authorization of emergency medical treatment
and hospital visitation. The Madison ordinance, which was drafted by
the City Attorney for introduction to the Madison Common Council,
would have required all employers, organizations and medical facilities
within the city's boundaries to extend these benefits to alternative fami-
lies. Alternative families would have registered with the City Clerk to
become eligible for benefits. This author was co-chair of the task force
during its almost two year existence and was a Commissioner on the
Equal Opportunities Commission through most of its discussion of the
alternative family rights ordinance. After extensive study and discus-
sion, the Madison Common Council rejected this broad ordinance. In-
stead, it amended the local zoning ordinance to include alternative nu-
clear families, and it extended sick and bereavement leave to City
employees living in alternative families.
Other cities have adopted legislation granting city employees the
right to obtain employment benefits for their domestic partners, includ-
ing Berkeley, West Hollywood, and Santa Cruz, California, as has the
School District of Berkeley, California. 3 The San Francisco Board of
Supervisors passed domestic partners' legislation twice which would
have registered domestic partners for benefits, including hospital and
jail visitation. Mayor Diane Feinstein vetoed the legislation both
times. "' The legislation is being rewritten with plans of reintroduction
11. THE REPORT OF THE MADISON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION ALTER-
NATIVE FAMILY RIGHTS TASK FORCE, April 11, 1985 at 1 of the Introduction [herein-
after cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
12. The Madison Equal Opportunities Commission later altered the definition of
an alternative family to include only "two adults... plus dependents" thus making its
definition of alternative family equivalent to the traditional nuclear family. A more
thorough discussion of how the courts can determine which groups comprise extended
alternative families was discussed by the California Supreme Court in City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal.3d 123, 133-134, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545, 610 P.2d 436,
442 (Cal. 1980).
13. See supra note 8. For a further discussion of domestic partnership laws, see
H. DURRY & D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 61-64
(1985).
14. See supra note 8.
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now that Feinstein is no longer mayor. A Minneapolis, Minnesota, or-
dinance would have extended benefits to alternative families on a city-
wide basis, similar to the Madison ordinance. 15 That ordinance was
never reported out of City Council committee, but one of its supporters
is considering reintroduction.16 East Lansing, Michigan, is considering
a zoning ordinance that would expand its "family" definition to include
functional families defined as a group of persons whose relationship is
of permanent and distinct domestic character."7
In discussing the legal system's response to alternative families
seeking an extension of traditional family benefits, this paper is divided
into two main sections. The first section summarizes the Madison expe-
rience in trying to pass a comprehensive alternative family rights ordi-
nance. It takes an in-depth look at the entire process from the grass-
roots pressures on the M.E.O.C. which resulted in formation of the task
force to the Common Council's enactment of two minor sections of the
proposed ordinance. It will analyze the political and legal process used
in an effort to obtain significant reform in the definition of family
within Madison. It will note that over six years of work was expended
by numerous activists, extensive grass-roots organizing was done to
generate broad community support for the proposed ordinance, and
thus far the legislative process has only yielded two minor amendments
to the local statutes.
The second section examines the limited progress that has been
made from working within the system to obtain an extension of benefits
and protection to all family members and raises the dilemma currently
facing activists working in this area. Because of our social and educa-
tional training, activists turn to the legal system with the belief that, by
going to it and challenging the inequities in society-in this case, the
discrimination against alternative families-we will be able, through
legislation or litigation, to obtain the recognition, benefits, and protec-
tion given to the traditional family. Because of our feminist perspective
and the lessons we have learned from seeing how patriarchal society"8
15. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section G, at 2-5.
16. Conversation with Bill Prock, Enforcement Manager of Minneapolis Civil
Rights Office, February 17, 1989.
17. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section G, at 36. It is important
to note that the definition of functional family referred to a "group of persons other
than a family." (emphasis added). While this may have been done simply to distin-
guish functional families from individuals meeting the ordinance's definition of family,
it can also be read to indicate a continuing view that alternative or functional families
are not "real" families. For a further discussion of this issue, see notes 123-24 and
accompanying text, infra.
18. The narrow definition of patriarchy is a system where the male head of the
household had complete legal and economic power over his dependents. G. LERNER,
THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 238-239 (1986). In its wider definition, and the one
that is used in this paper, patriarchy is "the manifestation and institutionalization of
male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male
19891
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deals with problems of inequity, however, we turn away from the legal
system with an understanding that it is a system of rules and regula-
tions designed to perpetuate the power of the patriarchy over women's
lives. 19 As Audre Lorde so eloquently explained, "[T]he master's tools
will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily
to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring
about genuine change."20
In the case of women's choices of intimate relationships, patriar-
chal society uses the "master's tools" of social pressure and privileging
only the traditional nuclear family with benefits to ensure that con-
formity in family composition will be maintained. Use of the legal sys-
tem to end this enforced conformity may bring about slow, incremental
change but will not completely loosen these bonds that have been
placed on individual expression and choice.
Activists interested in loosening these bonds inflicted by a patriar-
chal society are thus faced with the dilemma of wanting to use the
legal system to remedy injustice while knowing that genuine change
which recognizes the incredible breadth of women's choices of intimate
relationships will not result from working within the legal system.
Some progress has been made within the system toward recognizing
unmarried couples (whether gay, lesbian or heterosexual) as legitimate
families. But virtually no progress has been made for extended alterna-
tive families connected by choice, not blood. Not surprisingly, as sec-
tion two details, this lack of progress has impacted on poor and work-
ing-class people, people of color, and gay men and lesbians who tend to
form extended alternative families.
The risk that arises from achieving incremental results within the
system is the temptation to accept those results as sufficient. The chal-
lenge for activists is to remain dissatisfied with and critical of the sys-
tem. It means consciously deciding to work within the system to
achieve what is achievable within it, while retaining the energy and
vision to push the struggle into the streets. People, individually and to-
dominance over women in society in general. It implies that men hold power in all the
important institutions of society and that women are deprived of access to such power."
Id. at 239.
19. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1279-1280
n.3. See also Menkel-Meadow, The Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and
Legal Education or The Fem-Crits go to Law School, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 61 (1988);
Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquires of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERK.
WOMEN'S L. J. 64 (1985); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 83 (1980); Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy in THE
PoLITIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982). These authors es-
tablish that, in numerous areas, the legal system maintains the patriarchy's power,
rather than diminishes it. These areas include challenges to laws restricting women's
employment opportunities, affirmative action, the right to vote, and the ability to obtain
contraceptives and abortions.
20. A. LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (1984).
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gether, must continue in our day-to-day lives to ask for recognition and
benefits for our families at work, in our homes and in the streets. This
means consciousness-raising with our friends and family of origin about
our family of choice, speaking of our partners and children as family,
agitating at work to receive corresponding benefits and protection, and
organizing throughout our communities to bring forth acceptance of all
definitions of family and to attain the recognition that our families de-
serve. For in the end, recognizing alternative families means allowing
people freedom of individual expression and choice without extracting a
significant price for that expression.
This Article discusses alternative family rights from a feminist
context which attempts to include the perspectives of women of differ-
ent races, classes, and sexual preferences. These perspectives are neces-
sary to any meaningful critique of the accepted family definition be-
cause lesbians, poor and working class women, and women of color
form families outside the traditional definition more often than do het-
erosexual, white, middle-class women.
Additionally, this Article focuses on the perspective of women be-
cause women are most heavily impacted by the restrictions placed on
family choice. Even with the move away from the "separate spheres"
ideology of the nineteenth century where a woman's identity was based
on her role in the family,21 society continues to connect women more
closely than men to their families for identity, status, and economic
benefits. This connection impacts on women more heavily than on men
because the patriarchal tradition of family places the man at the head
of the family and the woman and children as his subordinates.2 2 So
when women's identity is connected with the home, that identity is fre-
quently one of subordination. Looking at how law affects and regulates
intimacy and women's choices of intimate partners means looking at
how law affects a significant and substantial portion of many women's
lives.
However, many of these restrictions also impact men's lives as
well, especially men oppressed by patriarchal power, such as gay or
working-class men and men of color. While the impact of patriarchal
power on these men is less because of the "male privilege" afforded
them, their relationships are also outside the accepted norm and are
also harmed by these restrictions. The reader is encouraged to remain
aware throughout this article of the impact on these men and to retain
a view of whether the questions asked or solutions posed will equally
resolve the problems for them as well.
21. Minow, supra note 2, at 866. See also Finley, Transcending Equality The-
ory: A Way Out of the Maternity and The Workplace Debate, 86 COL. L. REV. 1118,
1118-1120 (1986)(discussing ideology in society and legal system that separate spheres
still exist for men and women).
22. Minow, supra note 2.
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308 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW
I. THE MADISON EXPERIENCE
On April 25, 1983, the Madison Institute for Social Legislation
(MISL)23 sent a letter to the M.E.O.C. requesting that the Commis-
sion set up a task force to study the feasibility of introducing a "domes-
tic partners" bill to the Madison Common Council.24 According to
MISL's letter, domestic partners legislation would lead to fuller protec-
tion of rights guaranteed under the local equal opportunities ordi-
nance25 by recognizing diverse relationships between all individuals.26
MISL also volunteered to have some of its members serve on the task
force.2
7
In response to MISL's proposal, the M.E.O.C. established an ad
hoc committee (hereinafter referred to as the task force) to study the
broad range of issues involved in alternative family rights legislation.2 8
These duties included studying the issues involved in the legislation by
soliciting information from other cities where such legislation had been
considered, from businesses and corporations where benefits had been
extended, and from local organizations and individuals interested in the
concept.29 Additionally, the task force would provide information and
outreach; secure testimony from individuals and organizations through
M.E.O.C.-sponsored forums; investigate issues surrounding the ordi-
nance with City officials and agencies; prepare a detailed, well docu-
mented recommendation to the M.E.O.C. on the desirability and feasi-
bility of implementing an alternative family rights ordinance; and
provide testimony and documentation to the Common Council."
Numerous individuals and organizations were asked to join the
task force. The goal for membership was to include those individuals
and organizations who were supportive of alternative family rights,
would be affected by such legislation, or may oppose such legislation.
Attempts were made to include individuals of all ages, sexes, sexual
preferences, races, and classes. Some of the organizations invited to
send representatives included the Office of the State Insurance Com-
missioner, Lives Unlimited (a therapy collective), MISL (the original
23. MISL defined itself as a broad-based coalition of Madison residents repre-
senting a variety of community interests. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at
Section A, at 1-2.
24. Id. at 1. It is important to note that MISL envisioned a domestic partners'
ordinance which would extend benefits only to lesbian, gay and unmarried heterosexual
couples.
25. Madison General Ordinance § 3.23.
26. See supra note 24. However, the MISL proposal would not have extended
benefits to all individuals because it did not include extended alternative families.
27. Id. at 2.
28. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section B, at 1.
29. Id. These duties and goals were stated in a memo to the M.E.O.C. from this
author who served as convenor and co-chair of the task force.
30. Id. at Section B, at 1-2.
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proposer), Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wisconsin, Madison General
Hospital, Group Health Collective (a local health maintenance organi-
zation), Madison Federation of Labor (AFL-CIO local affiliate),
Y.M.C.A., Access to Independence (an organization supporting rights
for elderly and handicapped individuals), Greater Madison Chamber of
Commerce, Greater Madison Board of Realtors, Madison Apartment
Association, The UNITED (a local organization supporting gay and
lesbian rights), Dane County S.O.S. Senior Council, and the local
chapter of the National Organization for Women.31 Additionally, sev-
eral individuals of different races, classes, sexual orientations and ages
were asked to participate. No one interested in membership was turned
away. The task force ultimately consisted of seventeen individuals, sev-
eral of whom were representing organizations.3 2
The task force met, as a whole, from September 28, 1983 through
February 21, 1985.33 Much of this time was devoted to gathering infor-
mation and resolving issues such as the definition of alternative family
and the extent of coverage for the proposed legislation. The task force
began wrestling with the definition of alternative family at its Novem-
ber 17, 1983 meeting. 4 In its January 19, 1984 meeting, it adopted the
following working definition: "Two or more unmarried, legally adult
persons involved in a mutually supportive, committed relationship who
are registered publicly as 'domestic partners' in order to be considered,
under municipal ordinance, as a family."
' 5
Over the course of the next several meetings, the task force heard
testimony from organization representatives and individuals. The testi-
mony included such topics as concerns raised by individuals and health-
care providers on hospital visitation and treatment authorization;36 by
individuals and the Y.M.C.A. on membership policies; 7 by a neighbor-
hood association, the Madison Board of Realtors, a university professor
of Real Estate and Urban and Regional Planning, an attorney, and a
MISL representative on zoning definitions;38 by individuals on the im-
pact of an expanded family definition on children living in alternative
families; 39 by the MISL labor project, union representatives, city em-
ployees, employers and a health insurance representative on personnel
policies and insurance;40 and by several individuals opposing the ordi-
31. Id. at Section D, at 1-2.
32. Id. at Section C, at 1.
33. Id. at Section E, Index to Minutes, at 1-2.
34. Id. at Section E, Minutes of November 17, 1983, at 2.
35. Id. at Section E, Minutes of January 19, 1984, at 1.
36. Id. at Section E, Minutes of November 17, 1983, at 1; id at Section E,
Minutes of January 19, 1984, at 1-2.
37. Id. at Section E, Minutes of February 23, 1984, at 4-5.
38. Id. at 1-4.
39. Id. at Section E, Minutes of March 15, 1984, at 1-2.
40. Id. at Section E, Minutes of May 17, 1984, at 1-3; id at Section E, Minutes
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nance on religious grounds. 1
Additionally, on September 20, 1984, the task force sponsored a
public forum on alternative family rights.,2 It had the largest attend-
ance of any M.E.O.C.-sponsored forum in its twenty-year history. Over
126 individuals and organization representatives appeared in support of
the ordinance and sixteen more sent written statements in support;
thirty-seven individuals and organization representatives appeared in
opposition to the ordinance and thirteen more sent written statements
in opposition. 3
Over the course of the task force's existence, it determined that a
significant problem existed concerning benefits denied to alternative
families and granted to traditional nuclear families. It also discovered
that a vast array of alternative families were in existence and that they
encountered a wide range of problems and unequal treatment as com-
pared to traditional nuclear families.
While definitions, statistics and documentary evidence are useful
means to establish the variety and prevalence of alternative families,
44 I
have chosen to have women from various races, classes and sexual pref-
of June 21, 1984, at 1-5.
41. Id. at Section E, Minutes of October 18, 1984, at 1-2. See Cox, supra note 5,
at 30-31 n.131 for a sampling of the type of objections raised.
42. Id. at Section J, at 1.
43. Id. at Section J, at 64-79.
44. The M.E.O.C.'s report to the Common Council reiterated some of the statis-
tical findings concerning alternative families:
-In 1983, only twenty-nine percent of American households consisted of the
traditional nuclear family (a married couple with dependent children);
-More than eight million unmarried couples or one of every twenty-five
Americans would benefit from an alternative families ordinance;
-Since 1970, the number of unmarried couples has grown two hundred and
sixty percent and between 1970 and 1983, unmarried couples under forty-
five have increased by nine hundred and thirty percent;
-An estimated thirty percent of Madison area school children live in alterna-
tive families;
-Unmarried heterosexual couples are more likely to be black and have blue-
collar jobs; and
-Unmarried couples tend to be poorer than their married counterparts which
can, in part, be explained by discrimination.
REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
FAMILY RIGHTS ORDINANCE, October 21, 1987, at 1-2 (hereinafter REPORT OF THE
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION). For similar figures on the increase in unmarried
couples, see Comment, Loss of Consortium: Adoption of a Common Law Cause of
Action to a Modern Day Reality, 54 U.K.M.C. L. REV. 512, 135 (1986); Cox, supra
note 5, at 3 n.6-n.7. Additionally, there are an estimated twenty million lesbians and
gay men living in the U.S. See H. DURRY & D. CLIFFORD, supra note 13, at ix. The
prevalence of lesbian and gay families is so prevalent that, even in 1975, the American
Civil Liberties Union included a chapter on The Gay Family in its handbook, THE




erences "speak" about how they define "family." This type of personal
experience has often been left out of traditional academic articles
which has caused an absence and dehumanizing of women's voices. 45
Using these women's stories to show the breadth of alternative families
in existence allows me to remain true to the feminist method of con-
sciousness-raising, "collective critical reconstruction of the meaning of
women's social experience, as women live through it."
'46
Additionally, I present their experiences to show how society and
the legal system, by refusing to acknowledge these families-to legiti-
mate, protect and provide benefits to them-have inflicted harm on
these women and their family members. This section presents stories
gathered during the past six years that I worked with the M.E.O.C.
and the Madison Institute for Social Legislation to enact an alternative
family rights ordinance that would protect and benefit alternative fami-
lies or discovered while researching this article. These are but a few of
the stories of the numerous individuals who came forward to explain




a. Cheri and Janet live together in a committed relationship and
would like that commitment recognized by society.4 8 They have four
children, three of whom were from Janet's previous marriage and one
that they had together through artificial insemination. Cheri loves all
their children "just as much as any heterosexual couple. . . loves their
children. However, my life is very, very difficult for a number of rea-
sons which also affect my children. The baseline part of it is not diffi-
cult because I live in a very loving family, very loving household so that
makes that part of my life very nice and very pleasant. 49
However, when Janet became unemployed, it meant that they had
to support a family of six on $10,000. Even though Cheri had access to
family health insurance through her employer, she could not provide
health insurance to her family because her employer restricted cover-
age to traditional families. As a result, an extra $200 a month had to
be used to pay for family health insurance which, if she had been part
of a traditional family, would have been provided by her employer. Ad-
ditionally, because Janet bore their last child, Cheri has no legal rights
to him, even though she has primary responsibility for his care within
45. Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 4 n.15 (1987).
46. Wishik, supra note 19, at 69.
47. For a fuller understanding of the extent of the problem, see TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 11, at Sections E and J (task force minutes and public forum
transcript); Cox, supra note 5, especially at 46-50 which details problems encountered
by alternative families in hospital visitation and treatment authorization.
48. Testimony of Cheri Maples, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section
J, at 16-18.
49. Id. at 17.
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their family. She has no legal right to authorize medical care for him.
She has no legal right of access to his health records or school records.
Cheri wants to be a part of all her children's school activities, but
is afraid of what it may mean for them to have her with them when
they register for school.50 She is afraid that they will be harassed or
stigmatized because they come from an alternative family not recog-
nized by society or by law. For now, she believes that her children are
growing up without a lot of the things they should be entitled to finan-
cially, emotionally, and legally. She is not asking for anything to be
taken away from anybody; she is only asking for the option to be
included.
b. According to the Wisconsin Association of Single Adoptive Par-
ents, many single individuals are deciding to skip marriage and start
their families by adopting children."' These individuals want the re-
wards and fulfillment of raising children and are unwilling to forego
the experience even though they will be single parents. According to
Mary Cissoko who heads the Association and started her family by
adopting Amy Christine a few years ago: "There are lots of family
situations today that couldn't be called traditional . . . .People either
understand and empathize or they don't understand no matter how
much you try and explain it. A family is a family regardless of
makeup. A family is something you create."52
c. Ellen spoke about living in a seven-year-long relationship with
her male partner and his two children from a previous marriage.
5
3
They have chosen not to marry for personal reasons. When her partner
became unemployed and was unable to provide health insurance for
himself and his two children, she would have liked to be able to provide
insurance coverage for her family, a benefit granted to her co-workers
in traditional families. However, she was unable to provide this insur-
ance for her family because her definition of family did not coincide
with her employer's definition of family. Thus, she was denied employ-
ment benefits equal to those received by her co-workers and had the
additional burden of having to pay for family health insurance out-of-
pocket.
d. Janice and Crystal are living as a family with Crystal's two
50. Some school systems have begun to recognize alternative families and do al-
low adult alternative family members to register their children for school and pick-up
the children after school. However, alternative family members are unsure about when
their relationship will be recognized and thus have to face the problems that may arise
from intermittent recognition. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section E,
Minutes of March 15, 1984 at 2.
51. Kelley, Singles and Adoption, Milwaukee Sentinel, Mar. 27, 1987, at 2, col.
1.
52. Id.
53. Testimony of Ellen Magee, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section
E, Minutes of May, 17, 1984, at 2.
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daughters. Janice is a non-biological mother and co-parent for Crystal's
two daughters. 54 Janice and Crystal have the children in their home
every other week under a joint custody arrangement with the children's
father. Janice is completely involved in feeding, caring for, and raising
the girls, from preparing meals, taking them to school, bathing them,
reading bedtime stories, instilling responsibility in the girls to care for
themselves, and encouraging the girls to share their lives with her. She
has both physical and emotional responsibility for the girls and is
treated within the family as a co-parent.
According to Crystal, the girls' biological mother, she and Janice
want their family to be legally and socially recognized because Janice
has the same role in the girls' lives as does any other parent. In fact,
her youngest daughter told Crystal that when she grew up, she did not
want to be a mom. She wanted to be a co-mom. The children com-
pletely accept Janice as a part of their family and the children feel very
open about Janice's role as a co-parent.
However, outside the family, Janice's role in the girls' lives and
her responsibility for them is not recognized. Because of society's re-
fusal to recognize her role in the family, Janice and Crystal's family
has encountered significant harm. These harms include Janice's em-
ployer's refusal to allow her to use her sick leave to care for the girls
when they are sick even though sick leave is given to her co-workers
who are biological parents or stepparents to care for their children. If
Crystal did not receive employer-based insurance which covered the
girls, Janice would want to be able to provide insurance for her family
through her employer's plan but would be unable to do so. If Crystal
were ill or unable to care for the girls, Janice would want to be able to
take over the girls' care, but would be prevented from doing so. The
girls' biological father would be given complete authority over them.
Crystal and Janice believe that it is also a significant problem for
the children to not have their family recognized and legitimated by so-
ciety. Public recognition of their family by society and under the law as
an alternative family would be emotionally and psychologically positive
for the children, as well as for their parents. It is important for all
members of this family to be "on record" as a legitimate family.55
e. Two Hispanic women, Andrea-Teresa Arenes and Eluisa
Gomez, testified about the prevalence in many minority cultures of
having close ties with nonfamily members and giving them family sta-
tus and titles of respect.5 6 They also spoke about the denial of this fam-
54. Testimony of Janice Czyscon and Crystal Hyslop, TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 11, at Section E, Minutes of March 15, 1984, at 1.
55. Id.
56. Minutes of the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, February 27,
1986. See also Aschenbrenner, Extended Families Among Black Americans, 4 J.
CoMP. FAM. STUDIES 257, 266-268 (Autumn 1973). Aschenbrenner discusses how ex-
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ily status by white society and of struggling to maintain their extended
family relationships in the face of pressure to fit the norm of the white
nuclear family. Although they did not refer to any specific difficulties
they had encountered, they testified before the M.E.O.C. because they
thought that an alternative family rights ordinance would have a signif-
icant positive impact for many people of color and needed to include
protection for extended alternative families.
f. Lilah, Helen and Myrle (all over sixty) live together in one of
their church's group homes for the elderly.57 Besides being less expen-
sive than a retirement home, the group home provides nicer accommo-
dations and better company for its residents. The women furnished the
house themselves, perform light chores throughout the house, and make
joint decisions in areas that affect the household. They noted that it
took some adjustments getting used to group living but say that after
six months, they've "melted into a family. '58 The women are required
to be able to get around on their own and not need special care to live
in the home. They find that for elderly people who want to be indepen-
dent but cannot afford it, this living arrangement is a good alternative.
g. Martha and Alix are two women who live together, love to-
gether, and are raising a family together.5 9 They are living as a family
despite the pressures and punishments that society places on them for
defining their family in a way that is outside the conformity required
by society and law. They and their two children have been living to-
gether for over seven years.
When Alix tried to purchase a YMCA family membership for
Martha as a birthday present, the YMCA refused to sell one to her
because Alix's definition of family (an intimate relationship based on
trust, commitment and mutual support) did not match the YMCA's
definition of family (a married couple plus dependents as defined by the
tended kin relationships among unrelated Blacks established matrices within which
they found "their identity and purpose for living and striving." Id. at 267. Addition-
ally, Herbert G. Gutman discusses the widespread practice of black families investing
non-kin relationships with symbolic kin meanings and functions. H. GUTMAN, THE
BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1750-1925, at 217 (1976). This practice
existed during slavery as a method that bound children to fictive kin in case sale or
death separated them from their parents and blood relatives. Id. at 219. "Fictive" kin
also played roles in slave communities by binding unrelated adults to one another with
corresponding obligations. Id. at 220.
57. Smith, Sharing A Roof Sharing Their Lives, San Diego Tribune, April 13,
1988, at C-4, col. 3, 6.
58. Id. This group home in Vista, California is legal because the California Su-
preme Court has determined that restrictions in zoning ordinances cannot impinge on
individuals rights. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal.3d 123, 164
Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980). But in many states, restrictive zoning defini-
tions in single-family neighborhoods would prohibit this type of living arrangement.
59. Egerton, For 2 Women, This Holiday is Romantic One, Capital Times
[Madison, WI] February 14, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
[Vol. 8:299
ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
I.R.S.).60 After deciding that they were tired of society's negation and
the punishment of their family, they fought the YMCA's refusal to
recognize their family. They pursued their case under the Madison
Equal Opportunity ordinance61 and lost at both the hearing examiner
level and on appeal.62
A few years later, on Valentine's Day, a local newspaper ran an
article about Alix and Martha's relationship with each other and the
family they are raising together, with references made to their joint
incomes, jointly owned home, that they still cannot exercise as a family
together at the YMCA and that they must buy separate health insur-
ance protection for Alix and for Martha and her biological children.
63
These women have not allowed society's or the legal system's refusal to
recognize their family to keep them from living as a family and living
their intimate lives in the way they choose. But they are being forced to
pay a price: clearly financially and as clearly emotionally for freely ex-
pressing their intimate associational choice. They continue to make
that choice but they also continue to pay for their choice. The legal
system-society's rules and regulations--denies protection to or recog-
nition of their family, a contrast all the more noticeable because the
traditional family is given significant status, benefits and protection in
this society.
As all these stories indicate, the variety in family composition is
limited only by the number of people with whom one speaks. The chal-
lenge that follows for society and the legal system is whether this vari-
ety in family composition can be acknowledged so as to grant equal
recognition, protection and benefits to all families regardless of their
composition. It is to resolving this challenge that the task force turned.
Obtaining recognition of all alternative families was an issue that
plagued the task force from its inception. By its March 15, 1984, meet-
ing, the task force was struggling with whether eligibility for alterna-
tive family status should be restricted to unrelated adults and whether
family size should be restricted to two adults.64
Virtually its entire April 19, 1984, meeting was spent discussing
the scope of the alternative family definition. 5 The task force discussed
the problem of restricting eligibility to unrelated adults which would
exclude adult brothers and sisters wanting to provide insurance cover-
age for one another and married couples wanting to live together as
part of a larger group.66 The task force tried to resolve conflicting con-
60. Madison Equal Opportunities Commission Case No. 3110, Oct. 10, 1985.
61. Madison General Ordinance 3.23(1).
62. See Cox, supra note 5, at 50-51, for a discussion of their case.
63. Egerton, supra note 59.
64. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section E, Minutes of March
15, 1984, at 3.
65. Id. at Section E, Minutes of April 19, 1984.
66. Id. at 1. See also note 142, infra.
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cerns including wanting to err, if at all, on the side of including rather
than excluding individuals while being aware that if we made the defi-
nition too broad, we may be dooming it to failure politically.67
We acknowledged that defining alternative family as "two or more
adults" may lead to greater opposition from homeowners and neighbor-
hood associations in single-family neighborhoods and that the likeli-
hood of more than two persons being committed in the sense we were
discussing was probably limited. 8 One member stated the dilemma
quite succinctly when he urged us to consider our objectives. "Do we
want to recommend the optimum in what we believe needs to be ex-
tended as rights, or do we want to suggest what we believe is most
passable?"69 Ultimately we settled on "two or more adults" wanting to
provide dignity and a name for all individuals living in alternative fam-
ilies and not perpetuate injustice by excluding extended alternative
families from the definition. We did realize, however, that later in the
process it may become necessary to compromise on the definition in
order to obtain passage of the ordinance.
One problem repeatedly encountered by the task force was in ob-
taining testimony from businesses. While testimony was received from
some businesses,7 -1 repeated concern was expressed on obtaining addi-
tional testimony from businesses and insurance companies.7 2 Task force
members were aware that businesses and insurance companies would
be impacted by the changes required under the proposed ordinance and
wanted to obtain as much information as possible on their concerns so
that viable options could be developed. Attempts were made to contact
the local Chamber of Commerce,73 a survey was developed and sent to
local businesses asking for information on extension of sick leave, be-
reavement leave and health insurance benefits to alternative family




68. Id. at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at Section E, Minutes of February 23, 1984, at 4-5; id. at Section E,
Minutes of June 21, 1984, at 1-5.
72. Id. at Section E, Minutes of October 18, 1984, at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id. at Section K. Surveys were sent to twenty-one local businesses and four-
teen responses were received. Employer size ranged from firms with 0-250 employees to
firms with over 1000 employees. Most employers indicated that they limited sick leave
and bereavement leave to nuclear or extended family members, some did not offer sick
leave for family members' illnesses, and some included individuals outside the nuclear
or extended family at the supervisor's discretion. Id. at 1. All of the employers provided
some form of group health insurance benefits to their employees and most excluded
roommates or unmarried partners from the coverage. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at Section M. At the meeting, one member of the Commissioner's office
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Additionally, the task force surveyed 2,204 city employees con-
cerning alternative family rights and obtained responses from 568 em-
ployees or twenty-six percent.7 ' Fifty-nine individuals or ten percent of
the respondents (which was two and seven-tenths percent of the
workforce) indicated that they considered themselves members of alter-
native families. 7 According to the survey results, sixty-six percent of
them indicated that they would apply for health insurance benefits, ten
percent would not apply, and twenty-four percent were uncertain
whether they would apply.78 The survey indicated that the cost of pro-
viding health insurance benefits to the alternative families of city em-
ployees would be, at the most, an increase of three and eight-tenths
percent on a 1986 health insurance budget of $3,759,000.79
On April 11, 1985, the task force presented its recommendations
and report to the M.E.O.C. These recommendations indicated that the
task force had found evidence of discrimination in the City of Madison
on the basis of alternative family status which caused psychological,
social and economic harm to alternative family members and under-
mined local antidiscrimination legislation.8" The task force determined
that it was both desireable and feasible to enact an alternative family
rights ordinance.8' The task force retained its definition of alternative
stated that the impact of an ordinance extending health insurance benefits to alterna-
tive families or insurance companies would not be significant because two employed
individuals would probably retain their individual coverage rather than obtain a family
policy due to cost, and public registration would limit the number of people applying
for benefits. Id. at 2. He thought the insurance companies may resist providing cover-
age, especially due to concerns about AIDS or other "lifestyle" factors, but thought
they would not discontinue service to their customers as a result of being required to
extend coverage to alternative families. Id.
76. Results of Survey of City Employees Concerning Alternative Family Rights,
May 12, 1986. See Cox, supra note 5, at 28 n.120.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. This amount was calculated on the assumption that 10% of the work
force would apply for benefits, a number that was considered to be a high estimate. If
it is assumed that all city employees who are in an alternative family did respond to the
survey and that only the ones who indicated they would seek family benefits did, in
fact, seek these benefits, then the cost to the City would be $42,000.00 or 1.1% in-
crease in the 1986 health insurance budget. REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
COMMISSION, supra note 44, at 6. While this type of survey does not verify the cost to
employers, it can be seen from the survey that increased costs would not be significant.
Thus, most employers would not encounter staggering cost increases from equalizing
benefits between traditional families and alternative families. It would be disingenuous
for an employer like the City of Madison to resist paying from $42,000 to $122,000 for
alternative families' health insurance benefits when it is willing to pay almost four mil-
lion dollars annually to provide the same benefits to its employees and their traditional
families. Analyzed in this fashion, it becomes clear that cost considerations are simply
an excuse that some employers may use to justify their refusal to extend these benefits.
80. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Introduction, at 1.
81. Id. at 4.
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family as including two or more adults, together with their dependent
children.82 The task force also recommended that costs of registration
with the City should be covered by a registration fee, that all rights,
benefits, and opportunities given to families based on blood, marriage
or adoption should be extended to alternative families, and that alter-
native family status should be added to the anti-discrimination ordi-
nance as a protected class to prevent discrimination based on forming,
registering or maintaining an alternative family. 3
From May, 1985, until November 3, 1987, when the M.E.O.C.
presented its report to the Common Council on the proposed alternative
family rights ordinance, the M.E.O.C. took on the responsibility of de-
ciding whether to propose the ordinance and what its scope should
include.
The M.E.O.C. chose to narrow the definition of alternative family
in response to concerns raised by the Greater Board of Realtors, the
Madison Apartment Association, alderpersons and neighborhood as-
sociations.84 They all objected to the definition of "two or more adults"
because it could potentially allow groups of college students to register
as an alternative family in order to live in restrictively zoned neighbor-
hoods.8 5 The M.E.O.C. also added a requirement that alternative fami-
lies live together in a single housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit in
order to prevent abuse.8 6 Thus, the definition of alternative family
presented to the Common Council was: "Two adults unrelated by mar-
riage, blood, or adoption and their dependents living together as a sin-
gle housekeeping unit in a dwelling unit." '
In order to receive protection from discrimination, alternative fam-
ilies would be required to register publicly with the City Clerk's of-
fice. 8 When registering as an alternative family, the adults would be
required to sign an affidavit indicating that they meet the conditions
contained in the ordinance.8 9 It was believed that by requiring an affi-
davit of eligibility, those individuals who may fraudulently register
would be liable for perjury charges.Y0 Additionally, the proposed ordi-
nance granted any employer or company that suffered a loss due to a
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id.
84. REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, supra note 44, at 3.
85. Id. It should be noted that the Madison Zoning Ordinance does not restrict
traditional families to two adults and their dependents. Instead, it defines family, in
that case, to be two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Thus, it
can be seen that even in an ordinance intended to remedy discrimination in housing,
traditional families are given more protection than alternative families.








false statement in the registration affidavit the right to bring a civil
claim against the registrants to recover their losses, including reasona-
ble attorney fees. 1 The alternative families would be required to pay a
fee sufficient to cover the costs of registration. 2
The M.E.O.C. retained the task force's recommendation that all
employers in the City could not fire or refuse to hire an alternative
family member based on his or her family status and could not discrim-
inate in the extension of employment-based benefits.93 However, the
M.E.O.C. recommended that only the City be required to provide fam-
ily insurance benefits to its employees. 94 The exemption was made to
allow the City time to gather data on the financial impact of such an
extension of benefits before imposing it on private employers. 95 The
M.E.O.C. estimated that the annual cost to the City of providing these
insurance benefits would be $42,000 per year, with an unlikely possibil-
ity of ranging as high as $122,000.96
The M.E.O.C. also noted that many private employers have con-
flict of interest or anti-nepotism policies which include roommates and
lovers of an employee in the group excluded from certain relations with
the employer.97 Thus a double standard exists in employers' treatment
of alternative families.9 8 They are recognized as sufficiently "family-
like" for an employer to apply its anti-nepotism policy against them,
but they are not sufficiently "family-like" to be granted the same bene-
fits and privileges received by traditional families.
The M.E.O.C. argued that Madison should take the lead in acting
to end discrimination against alternative families, especially consider-
ing the number of Madison residents living in these families.99 It noted
that they are in committed relationships with other adults and are often
raising families.10 The M.E.O.C. report concludes by saying:
The EOC believes that it is time to recognize that in reality there
are many ways in which human families are formed. It believes that
many of the present protection against discrimination such as those
who are gay or lesbian, those who are handicapped, those who are
elderly,' 0' and those who are in racial minorities, are meaningless if
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6, 8 n.1.




101. The M.E.O.C. report noted the problems of unmarried elderly wanting to
live together to reduce costs and handicapped persons wanting to live with their live-in
attendants. Id. at 2. Often times restrictive zoning definitions prohibit these types of
accommodations. The prevalence of this type of arrangement was documented in
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those individuals cannot be protected from discrimination as families
in addition to being protected as individuals. We urge the Common
Council to adopt the alternative family rights ordinance."02
On August 2, 1988, the Madison Common Council enacted two
sections of the proposed ordinance and tabled the remaining sections.
The Common Council amended section 28.03(1) of the Madison Gen-
eral Ordinances to define "family" for zoning purposes to include "two
unrelated adults and the minor children of each." It also amended sec-
tion 3.36(15)(a)(2)(g) of the Madison General Ordinances to expand
the definition of "immediate family" to include "[a] person designated
in writing by the employee as a family partner or that partner's chil-
dren, stepchildren, or grandchildren." Thus, city employees may now
obtain paid absences from work for the death or illness of a member of
their alternative family.
However, the Common Council refused to enact two broader
amendments. The proposed amendment to section 3.23, the local Equal
Opportunities Ordinance, would have outlawed discrimination on the
basis of alternative family status in housing, employment, public ac-
commodations, city services and credit. Alternative families were to be
defined as "two adults and their dependents, if any" who had filed an
affidavit with the City Clerk indicating a relationship of mutual sup-
port, caring and commitment. This amendment, as drafted by the City
Attorney, would have required organizations selling memberships based
on family status to provide the same benefits to alternative families."0 3
It would have required the City as an employer to extend to alternative
families the same benefits extended to families based on blood, mar-
riage or adoption (including employer-paid family health insurance).,10
It would have prevented private employers from discriminating against
alternative family members in decisions to hire or fire or in conditions
of employment. 10 5 However, an exception would have exempted private
employers from providing insurance benefits to alternative families, al-
though they would have been required to provide equal benefits in all
other areas, such as sick leave and bereavement leave.10 8
Once it was determined that the entire amendment to section 3.23
would not pass, an attempt was made to simply amend the section on
public accommodations to include household memberships (open to two
adults living as a household along with their dependent children, if
any) whenever family memberships were offered. This amendment also
did not pass.
Smith, supra note 57.







Both were tabled and the sponsors expressed an intent to reintro-
duce these amendments in the spring of 1989. After six years of work
by this author and countless others, this piecemeal adoption of two mi-
nor sections of the proposed ordinance was a disappointing result, even
though the two amendments will have specific positive effects for nu-
merous Madison residents living in alternative families.
These families have been guaranteed the right to live together as a
family in neighborhoods with other families. The fact that an alterna-
tive family will now be the family next door is sure to broaden the lives
of both the alternative families and their traditional family neighbors.
Assuredly, traditional families' exposure to their alternative family
neighbors will result in some consciousness-raising concerning alternate
lifestyles and ways in which all families are similar to one another.
Additionally, City employees who are members of alternative fam-
ilies have gained the benefit of using their sick leave or bereavement
leave to care and to grieve for their family members. These employees
will no longer be forced to deny care to their family members during
illness because they cannot take time off work or to lie to their em-
ployer about the reason for their absence. They will be able to take
bereavement leave to mourn and to handle necessary arrangements for
their family member's death. This type of recognition of one's family
by an employer results in a better-adjusted, more content workforce.
Given the scope of the proposed ordinance, however, the Common
Council rejected its opportunity to make meaningful change. The
Council was presented with strong community support for the ordi-
nance and, more importantly, clear evidence of extensive discrimination
based on alternative family status. Enacting the proposed ordinance
would have prohibited such discrimination and would have been a ma-
jor step toward equalizing the benefits and protection enjoyed by tradi-
tional families and denied to alternative families.
But they refused to make such a move. They limited their changes
to minor, relatively costless changes. Perhaps they felt it was too big a
step to take; perhaps they did not find a broad enough coalition that
supported such change; perhaps they yielded to opponents raising the
specter of financial ruin and moral disintegration. More likely, the
Madison Common Council, even this small segment of the patriarchy's
legal system, retrenched and withstood this push for change. The minor
amendments gave the impression that the system was responsive to the
demands made upon it. The incremental advances renewed the commit-
ment of some supporters to keep on fighting. But the momentum build-
ing in the community in favor of alternative family rights was finally
halted: some participants dropped out in disgust with the process, some
dropped out because results were achieved, and others dropped out be-
cause the energy and time expended had been too extensive to be
maintained.
In order to understand the Madison experience of going to the le-
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gal system, looking for change, and in the end achieving just enough
change to legitimate the status quo, it is necessary to step back and
look at the broader context. The patriarchy established and maintains
the legal system for just this purpose. Activists' energy, time, and crea-
tivity are spent fighting for years through a bureaucratic and political
maze to obtain minor changes in oppressive laws. Analysis of the
Madison experience gains meaning by seeing it not as an isolated expe-
rience, but rather as another example of how the master's tools will not
dismantle the master's house.1"7
II. LAW AND PATRIARCHY
By seeing the Madison experience in context, one is able to grasp
the full meaning of what occurred during the six years that reform for
alternative families was sought in Madison, Wisconsin. Feminist activ-
ists working for change need to stop and appreciate the extent to which
the patriarchy uses the legal system to perpetuate the status quo and to
resist movements for genuine change in the way women are treated in
this society. We must then decide how to allocate our time and energy
between working within the system and working outside the system in
order to reduce the patriarchy's power over women's intimate lives.
This section begins by examining how the legal system combines
with societal pressure to coerce women into choosing the traditional
nuclear family as the only acceptable form of intimate relationship.
This coercion comes from giving recognition, protection and benefits to
members of traditional nuclear families, while denying the same to
women who define their family outside this accepted norm. Having
chosen to benefit and protect the traditional nuclear family, patriarchal
society and the legal system resist challenges to the status quo that
would expand the definition of family to include alternative families.
Thus, working within the system will result in expenditures of energy,
time and creativity while attaining only minor changes, if any.
The section then looks at two examples of the legal system's resis-
tance to expanding the definition of family which can be seen from the
Madison experience. First, although given the opportunity to make
wide-scale changes which would have granted benefits, such as health
insurance, sick leave and bereavement leave to all alternative families
in the city, the Common Council stopped at granting sick and bereave-
ment leave benefits to City workers living in alternative families and
not extending family health insurance to any alternative families. Thus,
the Council refused to make those changes which would have given
significant help to working class people. As the story of Janet and
Cheri indicated, denial of these benefits meant a cost of $200 a month
for a family of six living on $10,000 a year. This section examines how
107. See supra note 22.
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the legal process successfully resisted the expansion of benefits which
would have resulted in the meaningful improvement in the financial
health and security of alternative families. Although the extension of
sick leave and bereavement leave to members of alternative families
who are City employees will assist those families, the number helped is
incredibly limited given the expansive alternative available to the Com-
mon Council.
Second, although encouraged to expand the definition of alterna-
tive families to include extended alternative families, the M.E.O.C. re-
fused to even recommend such an expansion on the family definition to
the Common Council. It ensured that any expansion in the definition of
family would be limited to alternative families based on the nuclear
family model. Thus, the broad definition of alternative family used by
the Madison Task Force (two or more adults and their dependents)
was repeatedly narrowed over years of deliberation and political com-
promise to its current definition (two adults and their dependents). This
section examines how the legal process adulterated the original attempt
to gain recognition and benefits for all families regardless of composi-
tion by narrowing the definition of alternative family to the patriarchal
vision of family expressed by the traditional nuclear family.
Although a definition of family that does not differentiate between
families based on the sex or marital status of the partners does improve
the lives of countless individuals excluded by the current preference for
the traditional nuclear family, it does not recognize many other alter-
native families, especially the nonblood-based extended families preva-
lent among people of color, working class people and gay men and les-
bians. Limiting alternative families to two adults and their children still
forces women into strict conformity with the nuclear family model so
that unmarried heterosexual, gay, or lesbian couples become the only
alternative families legally recognized.
This limited expansion in the definition of family appears to be as
much progress as can be expected from working with the legal sys-
tem. 08 This Article thus concludes by encouraging activists to resist
this narrow definition of family because accepting such a definition re-
quires the "selling out" of a truly feminist, non-racist, non-classist,
challenge to the family definition currently recognized by the legal sys-
tem and society. Thus, activists working for genuine social change,
while working within the legal system to obtain recognition for alterna-
tive nuclear families, must maintain the energy and vision to work
outside the legal system to continue the struggle against restrictions
placed on family choice.
108. But see supra note 7, referring to state court cases where the definition of
family in those zoning ordinances was expanded to include extended alternative
families.
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A. How the Legal System Coerces Women into Choosing Traditional
Families
The effectiveness of using the legal system to achieve changes of
women's status in patriarchal society was questioned by Diane Polan in
her work, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy.109 She argues that
historically, and until very recently, the legal system has operated with-
out even the appearance of fairness or equal treatment toward women
and people of color.110 Women and people of color have quite correctly
viewed the legal system as an instrument of their domination and as an
integral part of their subordination by society."' 1 But the patriarchy
has not limited its tools to the use of the legal system. In fact, Polan
notes that "patriarchy has been primarily maintained not by legal
means but by nonlegal forces and social institutions, in particular, the
family." 12
Polan goes on to argue that patriarchy and its henchman, the legal
system, have not needed to use physical coercion to maintain male
domination and female subordination.1 3
Throughout history, ideas about women, the family, and the rela-
tionship between women and the outside world have been effectively
used to rationalize inequality and the inferior status of women. Pa-
triarchal ideology has been successful to the extent that it has con-
vinced women that our social, political, and economic subordination
and our psychological feelings of inferiority are the result of natural
forces rather than exploitative social relations .. . .[Patriarchy's]
overall function-the legitimation of male supremacy-has re-
mained the same.1
1 4
The use of social pressures and the legal system by the patriarchy has
maintained male domination of women. The patriarchy uses these same
social pressures and the legal system to maintain the traditional nu-
clear family as the only accepted family type and to keep individuals
within socially acceptable relationship groupings.
In arguing that patriarchy has been maintained by non-legal
forces and social institutions such as the family, Polan perhaps has not
recognized that the family as commonly defined in American society
(husband, wife, and children) has been primarily maintained by the
109. Polan, supra note 19.
110. Id. at 299.
111. Id. Indeed, in the 1800s when the courts began recognizing women's indi-
vidual rights as against their husbands, the judicial partiarchy "assured that women's
domestic powers would not be translated into extensive external political and economic
authority." M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 301 (1985).
112. Id. at 296.




legal system. The legal system perpetuates the traditional nuclear fam-
ily by recognizing it as the "only" family and by locating benefits and
protection in it. It limits access to these benefits and protection to those
individuals who choose the traditional nuclear family as their primary
intimate relationship. By so doing, the legal system effectively limits
women's choices in making intimate relationship decisions or extracts a
high price from those who refuse to be confined to that norm.
Heterosexual women who choose not to marry their male partner
are engaged in a battle with the patriarchal legal system. Many of
these women refuse to accept either the historical disability115 or the
current significance that law and society place on the institution of
marriage or they refuse to marry simply because they do not want the
legal system to become intimately involved in their personal relation-
ships. Similarly, heterosexual women living in relationships with several
adults of both sexes often choose to live communally in order to limit or
reduce the patriarchal power that comes from partnering with one
male. Additionally, many lesbians choosing to partner with one woman
or several women do so to reject the power of the patriarchy and men
in their personal lives. All these women, by making relationship choices
outside the traditional nuclear family, are fighting against a complex
web of legal protection and societal benefits that will be awarded to
them only if they belong to a traditional nuclear family.
Even if a woman has no particular "political" reason for rejecting
the traditional nuclear family as her choice for structuring her intimate
relationships, she is dealt with by society and the legal system in the
same way as those making a political challenge to the legal system. She
is refused common, valuable protection and benefits and is made to see
herself in a relationship that is "less than" the traditional norm.
In the same way that patriarchy and its henchman, the legal sys-
tem, have not needed to use physical coercion to reinforce male power
and female subordination, patriarchy and the legal system have not
used blatant coercion to force women into choosing the traditional nu-
clear family as their primary intimate relationship. It is enough to re-
strict the definition of family to a husband, a wife, and their children.
Thus, no one even assumes that any other composition is possible if a
group is defined as a family." 6 If a woman chooses a male partner, and
chooses to marry him according to the legal system's requirements, she
will be given recognition, benefits and protection. Her children will also
receive recognition, benefits and protection.
But if she chooses an "incorrect" family type, she loses all the
115. For a description of this historical disability, including the married woman's
inability to contract without her husband's consent, to enter a profession, to control her
property or wages, to sue or be sued, or to obtain legal custody of her children, see
Minow, supra note 2, at 828.
116. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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privileges she otherwise would have received. Her children also lose
these privileges. Thus, the legal system does not need to forbid women
from choosing to live in alternative families. The pure force of social
custom and the threatened loss of legal benefits and protection act to
"coerce" women into choosing the traditional nuclear family as their
intimate relationship.
The patriarchal ideology that "family" means a husband, a wife
and their children has convinced women that the only "real" family is
the traditional, nuclear family. Just as the patriarchy succeeded in con-
vincing women that their inferior political, economic, and social status
resulted naturally from differences between men and women,117 it has
succeeded in convincing women that family means a relationship with a
man blessed by marriage. Those who choose to live in alternative fami-
lies hear the clear signal that they are not "really" living as a family
and their relationship does not deserve the name "family." 118 This lack
of recognition by society and the legal system serves to keep many
women from even investigating alternatives to the nuclear family and
exacts the price of "differentness" from those who live outside the
norm.
Thus, the patriarchy will coerce some to enter these traditional
relationships by means of peer pressure to be "the same as everyone
else." It will coerce others by attaching too large an economic price to
the choice of alternative family status. And it will ensure that those
who live in alternative families will be reminded on a daily basis of
their "anti-social" choice, by attaching a significant cost for doing so.
B. Use of the Legal System Will Not Achieve Meaningful Change
The success of social pressures and the legal system to legitimate
the status quo can be seen from the use women and other oppressed
groups make of the legal system and legal discourse in challenging pa-
triarchal power in their lives. Janet Rifkin has noted that using legal
strategies, such as legislation and litigation, as a means to challenge the
power of the patriarchy has simply reinforced the legal system's legiti-
macy as the mechanism for resolving conflict and achieving social
change.1 9 The danger with asking the legal system to lessen its power
over and control of women's lives is that by "upholding and relying on
the paradigm of law, the paradigm of patriarchy is upheld and rein-
forced.""' And thus the patriarchy simply maintains its domination
and effectively decreases the likelihood that oppressed groups will seek
more radical solutions to their subordinate status.12 1
117. Polan, supra note 19, at 299.
118. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
119. Rifkin, supra note 19, at 95.
120. Id. at 88.
121. Polan, supra note 19, at 300.
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To the extent that those groups choose to articulate their social criti-
cism and their grievances in the law's limited categories-"equal
rights" and "equal opportunities"-and confine their action to litiga-
tion and lawmaking rather than struggle in such alternative arenas
as the workplace, the family, and in organized religion, they are giv-
ing up the battle, because in so doing, they are tacitly approving the
underlying social order and thus undermining more radical chal-
lenges to the overarching male supremacist and white supremacist
structure of society.' 2
2
This same analysis can be applied to see how patriarchy and the
legal system use the definition of family to restrict women's choices of
intimate relationships, use social pressures to maintain continued ac-
ceptance of the traditional nuclear family as "the family," and divert
activists' energy in the struggle for genuine change from radical solu-
tions to legally articulable claims. For political activists wanting to end
this patriarchal restriction and oppression, the question becomes what
type of change will result from struggling within the system to expand
the definition of family and what challenges must be made outside the
legal system to recognize all alternative families.
For this political activist, who has spent over six years and hun-
dreds, if not thousands of hours, working with the Madison Equal Op-
portunities Commission and the Madison Institute for Social Legisla-
tion to pass a comprehensive alternative family rights ordinance in
Madison, Wisconsin, the question has become did we expeet too much
of the legal system and, by focusing our struggle within the system,
have we weakened our ability to work outside the system and make a
truly radical challenge to the patriarchal definition of family. Watching
the proposed ordinance go through the political process, even at this
small, city-wide level, I discovered both the limited extent to which the
legal system can be used to achieve genuine change and the incredible
facility with which patriarchal oppression based on class, race, and sex-
ual orientation was maintained. What led to this discovery was partici-
pating in the political process to define alternative family for use in an
ordinance which was intended to extend meaningful recognition, pro-
tection, and benefits beyond the traditional nuclear family.
First, it was watching the political process restrict extension of
benefits from ones which would improve the economic stability of alter-
native family members working throughout the City in both the public
and private sector to ones that only extended sick leave and bereave-
ment leave to City employees living in alternative families. Inclusion of
family health insurance for alternative families under employers' group
plans was necessary to provide significant assistance especially to work-
ing-class families and people of color who disproportionately are also
122. Id.
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saddled with the burdens of economic class.' 23
As noted in my previous article, the cost to an alternative family
of lost family health insurance can range up to $4,400 per year.124 For
working-class and many middle-class alternative families, loss of em-
ployment-based family health insurance means the loss of family health
insurance completely. It becomes an unaffordable luxury which re-
mains out of reach. This loss can lead to the poor health and nutrition
of family members, risk of a catastrophic injury or illness that will de-
stroy the family's financial stability, and perhaps even destruction of
the family or homelessness, all resulting from denial of a benefit freely
given to, and expected by, traditional families.
In light of the importance of this benefit, the Common Council's
refusal to extend family health insurance benefits to even the City's
own employees shows a shocking disdain for alternative families and
their needs. Additionally, by extending sick leave and bereavement
leave benefits to City employees, the Common Council clearly recog-
nized the importance of and need for those benefits. Its refusal to ex-
tend even these relatively costfree benefits to all employees within the
City of Madison shows its virtually nonexistent commitment to mean-
ingful change. From this vantage point, the extension of sick leave and
bereavement leave benefits comes through as a minimizing, placating
gesture at best, intended to alter the status quo just enough to make
the legal system appear responsive while staving off more fundamental
challenges to the patriarchy. It also clarifies the patriarchy's lack of
concern for protecting those outside its accepted norm.
Second, it was also watching the political process narrow and re-
strict acceptable alternative families to fit the traditional nuclear model
that led me to this conclusion, even more than only attaining very lim-
ited success in achieving change for alternative families. Granted, it
was disappointing after the incredible time spent and the extensive
community support achieved to simply obtain an expansion of the defi-
nition of family in the zoning ordinance and an extension of bereave-
ment and sick leave benefits for the alternative nuclear families of city
employees. This limited success, however, has left many activists con-
vinced of the merit of making legal challenges for alternative families
and prepared to seek continued extension of benefits to these alterna-
tive families in the future.
But watching how the legal system effectively rejected all but
123. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Decisions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1061
(1978).
124. See Cox, supra note 5, at 32 n.136 which explains that employees denied
employer-paid family health insurance which is provided to traditional families but not
to alternative families lose a benefit worth up to at least $2,200 annually. The alterna-
tive family must then purchase family insurance at a cost of at least $2,200 a year
which results in a net cost of at least $4400 per year and possibly as much as $4,700.
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those alternative families based on the nuclear family model led to my
understanding of the ease with which the legal system serves to perpet-
uate patriarchal oppression based on race, class, and sexual orientation.
At first blush, it seems unlikely that the political process of defining
alternative family could raise significant questions of race, class, and
sexual orientation. But further exploration shows that it did raise ex-
actly those questions.
The M.E.O.C. task force recommended that the definition of alter-
native family consist of "two or more adults . . . together with their
dependent children" although such a definition might make the ordi-
nance more difficult to pass on a political basis. 2 ' The taskforce under-
stood that it was important to include all families based on choice in
the proposed definition and that a more restrictive definition would per-
petuate the discrimination encountered by alternative families outside
the nuclear family model.' 26
The issue turned on whether the definition of alternative family
should be restricted to those alternative families that are based on
"couple" relationships similar to the traditional nuclear family or
whether it should include all groups that provide the same type of sup-
port, caring, love and involvement with other family members that is
assumed to exist in the traditional family. In resolving this issue, the
broader question arises of whether the legal system has the ability to
move beyond a classist, racist, and homophobic system to acknowledge
the true breadth of intimate relationships in existence among people
today.
Besides those families based on lesbian, gay, or unmarried, hetero-
sexual couple relationships, families are also based on the intimate,
long-term relationships of three, four, five or more adults plus their de-
pendents which are formed by individuals in search of expanded types
of intimate relationships. An example of this type of family is seen in
the California case of City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, the zoning
case where twelve individuals were living together in a supportive, com-
mitted relationship. 27 After being challenged by the City of Santa
Barbara for violating its zoning ordinance, the family pursued its legal
remedies all the way to the California Supreme court, which ruled that
the right to privacy contained in the California Constitution protected
that family from harassment by the Santa Barbara. 2 " Families such as
these are in existence across the country and often are composed of
working class people and people of color. 129
125. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section E, Minutes of November
15, 1984, at 1-2.
126. Id.
127. 27 Cal.3d 123, 164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436 (1980).
128. 27 Cal.3d at 129-30, 164 Cal.Rptr. at 542-43, 610 P.2d at 439-40.
129. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508-509 (1977) (Bren-
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As was stated before the Equal Opportunities Commission, for
many people of color, an informal extended family is common prac-
tice. 130 Often intimate friends of a couple are included in the family
with the honorary title of aunt or uncle. These adults support one an-
other, take responsibility for child care within the extended family, and
have the same type of intimate, committed relationship that is seen in
the blood-related extended family. 1' Rather than being confined to in-
cluding only blood relations in their extended family, these individuals
base family membership on commitment and support, and they share
the benefits and sorrows of the family group together.
Additionally, as was noted by the Supreme Court in Moore v.
East Cleveland, the extended family has been a tradition of working
class people and people of color for many years.' 32 Oftentimes this type
of extended family intimacy and connection was necessary to help indi-
vidual family members deal with the pressures and problems associated
with living in a classiest and racist society.' 33 Extended family mem-
bers were called upon to provide physical and emotional support to in-
dividual family members or to nuclear families within the extended
family network.13 4 When individuals or nuclear families could not fi-
nancially support themselves due to the low wages, limited employment
opportunities and discrimination regularly encountered by working
class people and people of color, what has kept them from hunger, evic-
tion, injury or physical abuse was provided, not by society, but by the
extended family."'
To the extent that the extended family consists of blood or marital
relations, they are considered family by this society and given recogni-
tion and some legal protection.'36 But to the extent that the extended
nan, J., concurring).
130. See supra note 60.
131. See Aschenbrenner, supra note 56, at 268 (discussing research indicating
that the "fictive" extended family was necessary in slave communities because, with
mother and father working in the fields, other adults in the community had to take over
responsibility for the children). See also H. GUTMAN, supra note 56, at 220-21 (refer-
ring to research which shows that, in late medieval and early modern Europe, quasi-kin
ties between adults made the social environment more stable). These quasi-kin obliga-
tions reinforced cohesion within social classes and led to social solidarity beyond the
immediate family and kin networks. Id. at 221.
132. 431 U.S. 494, 500-503 (1977).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 509 n.6-9.-
135. H. GUTMAN, supra note 56, at 448-449. Gutman cites the study of Crandall
A. Shiffiet on The Household Composition of Rural Black Families: Louisa County,
Virginia, 1880, which indicates a close relationship between households and low eco-
nomic status. Id. at 448 n. Shifflett argues that "the burden of poverty induced black
families to rely on kinship networks and to become their brothers' keepers." Id.
136. However, extended traditional families do not receive all the benefits that
traditional nuclear families receive. For example, Doug Meyer testified that he lives
with his sister and his father. Both he and his sister have children who live with them
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family consists of adults connected, not by blood or marriage, but by
personal relationship and commitment, further difficulties are encoun-
tered. These difficulties range from problems caused by violation of
zoning laws, such as in Adamson, to denial of access to hospital or jail
visitation; inability to remove children from school, attend school func-
tions, or obtain school records; and to the inability to use sick leave or
bereavement leave to care for members of the extended family.
137
While these problems are also encountered by middle-class, whites
who have extended family relations with "unrelated" adults, the diffi-
culties are accentuated when imposed on top of the discrimination al-
ready endured by people of color and working class people. Another
group that also encounters this additional prejudice are the extended
alternative families of lesbians or gay men. Oftentimes, "out" lesbians
and gay men become distanced from their blood families due to
homophobia and parental rejection and their partners are not recog-
nized as "marital" family either. 38 These individuals and their part-
ners often form intricate extended family relations with supportive
friends in their own community." 9 A genuine expectation of support
and mutual commitment exists in these relationships and this extended
family of choice is used to replace the lost family of origin. 40 The same
lack of recognition explained above also occurs for these families espe-
cially because their strong support and commitment to one another is
often invisible to heterosexual society.
This invisibility and the lack of protection and recognition that re-
sults causes significant problems for the individuals involved. As was
testified to at a M.E.O.C. task force meeting, one gay man involved in
a "gay bashing" incident ended up in a local hospital in critical condi-
tion."'' His partner and his extended family consisting of close intimate
friends were not allowed to visit him or make choices for his medical
care. Instead, the hospital contacted his blood family, with whom he
had no connection because they had rejected him for his lifestyle,
which was incompatible with his parents' fundamentalist Christian
views. However, it was his parents, not his "family," who were recog-
nized by the hospital and given authority to determine his medical care
also. They tried to obtain one family membership to the YMCA for their entire family.
They were not allowed to do so and were forced to buy three memberships instead (one
for himself and his children, one for his sister and her children, and one for his father).
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section J, at 18-19.
137. See supra Section I, and the experiences related therein.
138. M.V. BORHEK, COMING OUT PARENTS (1983).
139. Clunis & Green, Friends, Family and Sense of Community in LESBIAN
COUPLES 95-111 (1988); C. BECKER, UNBROKEN TIES: LESBIAN Ex-LOVERS 155-161
(1988).
140. Clunis & Green, supra note 139, at 103.
141. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Section E, Minutes of January 19,
1984, at 1.
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and treatment. Additionally, against the advice of his doctors, the
man's parents removed him from the hospital to their home over 500
miles away. The parents refused to allow his Madison family to contact
him at all.142
These problems and difficulties are behind the movement for the
recognition of all alternative families regardless of the families' size or
composition. However, even when organizations or municipalities have
begun to recognize alternative families or domestic partners based on
the coupling relationship of two individuals, either heterosexual or ho-
mosexual, there has been a complete rejection of the extended alterna-
tive family as it exists in society today.
After two years of discussion, the task force recommended an al-
ternative family definition of "two or more adults . . . plus depen-
dents,"'14 3 because it recognized the strong part that the extended alter-
native family plays in the lives of many alternative family members.
Rather than simply adopting society's preference for the nuclear family
based on a couple relationship along with any children of that couple,
the task force determined that meaningful social change and reform in
this area required recognition of all types of alternative families. It con-
sidered that its job would be incomplete if it imposed the nuclear fam-
ily model onto alternative families.4
Despite this recommendation, the M.E.O.C. limited the definition
to "two adults . . . plus dependents.' 145 One reason for this change
was a problem that the M.E.O.C. envisioned and that the task force
had addressed and resolved. The M.E.O.C. and the task force envi-
sioned substantial opposition from the insurance industry based on
fears that one employee and his or her friends would join together as
an alternative family simply to obtain coverage under the employee's
health insurance.' 46 To prevent this problem, the task force decided
that in cases of extended alternative families, only one designated
"spouse equivalent" would be eligible for health insurance coverage
along with any children of that relationship. 47
The insurance companies responded that this was inadequate to
resolve the problem because even if only one additional adult were cov-
ered, it was still possible to choose the "sickest" person for coverage (a
142. Id. For a similar problem encountered by a lesbian after her partner was
critically injured and she was denied visitation rights, see K. THOMPSON & J. ANDRZE-
JEWSKI, supra note 9.
143. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Introduction, at 1.
144. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
145. Draft Ordinance Amendment, § 2 at 2.
146. However, some unmarried heterosexual couples decide to marry in order to
obtain these and other benefits. In that situation, the insurance companies do not seem
to be concerned.




process known as adverse selection in the insurance industry) and in-
surance companies would thereby become responsible for potentially
expensive health-care costs. 48 One way to resolve this whole issue
would be through federal- or state-provided health insurance coverage
for all individuals so that this potential for "fraud" could not be used
as an excuse to negate the recognition of extended alternative families.
An additional concern that was raised by the M.E.O.C. was the
concern of "huge" alternative families invading quiet, peaceful nuclear
family neighborhoods and causing substantial noise, parking and other
problems. However, under current zoning ordinances, there is no corre-
sponding concern for the "huge" traditional family with eight, ten or
twelve children invading these very same neighborhoods. Indeed, with
the current zoning ordinances simply requiring relationships based on
blood, marriage or adoption, the possibility of such invasions already
exists. Not surprisingly, this concern has been raised only in the process
of recognizing alternative families, not raised or voiced against tradi-
tional families. In any event, density zoning, which regulates housing
occupancy on the basis of a specific space requirement for every person,
rather than family definition, could be adopted in place of the current
regulations to address this concern. Cities might also consider regulat-
ing noise, off-street parking or the number of units per acre in order to
reduce the density of neighborhoods while not excluding alternative
families.149
In reality, the major stumbling block to recognizing extended al-
ternative families seemed to come from the inability of the Commission
members to envision family to include more than Ward, June, Wally
and the Beaver. While they did eventually show a willingness to admit
that there are alternative families made up of heterosexual or gay and
lesbian couples, they were unable to envision or understand the impor-
tant place that extended alternative families play for countless individ-
uals. The Madison Common Council exhibited this same inability as
can be seen from the "two adults . . . plus their dependents" definition
that was incorporated into the enacted ordinance. Perhaps part of their
lack of vision or understanding can be explained by the supposition that
they were offended that extended alternative families might receive
more protection and benefits than traditional extended families receive.
Perhaps it was simply an unwillingness to address the difficult, but re-
solvable, problems that would have to be resolved if family were to
mean more than two adults plus children.
148. Id. at Section E, Minutes of June 21, 1984.
149. Netter & Price, Zoning and the Nouveau Poor, A.P.A. J., Spring 1983, at
171, 175.
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CONCLUSION
As the previous section has illustrated, the process of using the
legal system to extend meaningful benefits to all alternative families
runs afoul of the patriarchy's classist, racist and homophobic beliefs.
Given this experience, will activists obtain genuine change by working
within the system, and if not, do we reject the system and make our
challenges from outside the system? If we work outside the system,
what avenues do we take and what results can we expect?
At this point, after six years of continuous struggle and contro-
versy, my viewpoint is that the legal system cannot, or perhaps more
importantly, will not, fully accept that all alternative families, even
those outside the nuclear family norm, are entitled to the recognition,
protection and benefits that traditional families receive, including those
with price tags attached. Activists cannot expect responsiveness from
the legal system because it is patriarchy's henchman and the patriarchy
is committed to retaining the traditional family as the only accepted
definition of family in patriarchal society.
But, at the same time, we must acknowledge, as others fighting for
change before us have acknowledged, the legal system is a powerful
tool of the patriarchy. If change can be obtained within the system, it
can have immediate and far-reaching results for those oppressed by the
status quo. In Madison, use of the legal system has resulted in gaining
some recognition and benefits for many alternative families. If nothing
else, Madison residents have been exposed to continuous news stories
about alternative families.15 0 Part of the community has had its con-
sciousness raised on the issues and problems confronting alternative
families. Working within the system, even when legal reforms fail, can
serve the feminist enterprise as well."'1 When attempts to obtain funda-
mental rights for all fail, as with this attempt to obtain benefits for all
alternative families, the hypocrisy of the legal system is exposed. 152 We
have thus gained the opportunity to point out this inequality and to
organize and mobilize alternative families toward political action. 5 3
Although we have begun to achieve some small recognition of the
variety of family types in existence, we have not come close to reaching
the goal of ensuring equal treatment of all families regardless of their
composition. Even equal treatment within the legal system is not
150. A limited recounting of stories on alternative families in Madison newspa-
pers includes stories in OUT! in July, 1983; The Daily Cardinal on February 17, 1984;
OUT! in May, 1984; OUT! in July, 1984; OUT! in December, 1984; OUT! in January,
1985; Isthmus on May 31, 1985; The Capital Times on May 31, 1985; The Capital
Times on February 14, 1987; and The Capital Times on April 28, 1988. Countless
other articles also appeared in all Madison newspapers.
151. See Littleton, supra note 45, at 5.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 6 n.20.
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enough. For as Polan states, obtaining equality within this system sim-
ply serves to legitimate the system."'
I agree with Polan and Rifkin that going to the legal system
means going to the patriarchy and asking the patriarchy for genuine
change. The patriarchy will resist and while resisting, it will try to out-
live the momentum and efforts of activists seeking change. That is what
happened in Madison.
A small group of activists representing a broad coalition of inter-
ests convinced the M.E.O.C. that discrimination existed and needed to
be ended. We presented material from other cities showing responses
by those cities, by employers and by organizations to the needs of these
oppressed groups. Because the M.E.O.C. believes that working within
the system will result in genuine change, it agreed to study the feasibil-
ity of implementing an ordinance which would ban discrimination
against alternative families.
The activists involved in this challenge to the patriarchy spent
hundreds of hours in the basements of various city buildings, in restau-
rants, and in drafty classrooms motivated by the ideal of change. It had
worked elsewhere; it would work in Madison.
We organized and we theorized. We were savvy about the place
politics would play but were also responsive to our coalition and knew
we needed to attempt as far-reaching change as was possible. So we
held on to the ideal of obtaining an extension of family health insur-
ance benefits and defining alternative families to include extended al-
ternative families because we saw a need and we responded to it.
We were willing to seek change within the system. We knew that
seeking this kind of legislation would mobilize our communities and we
thought that the chance of meaningful change was worth the effort.
What we did not realize was the extent to which the patriarchy's
legal system would resist change. And here we were naive. We thought
that a well-documented showing of discrimination, a thorough gather-
ing of supporting documents, and strong community support would
achieve the result we desired-genuine change to end discrimination of
all types against all alternative families.
155
But we did not correctly estimate the strength of the patriarchy to
resist us. We did not comprehend the extent of the threat we presented
to the status quo. Recognizing diverse families meant a step toward
challenging all the other assumptions underpinning the patriarchy's al-
location of power, money and justice. Now reality has hit us in the face
and we can no longer pretend that working within the legal system will
result in extensive meaningful change.
154. See Polan, supra note 19, at 300.
155. At least, we wanted an end to all types of discrimination over which the city
had control. We recognized that ending some types of discrimination was beyond the
City's power. See supra note 6.
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As long as the challenge is not too significant, the legal system
may be responsive. Responsiveness in the face of enough community
support is required to maintain the appearance of justice. The progress
we have made with various cities, with various employers, and with
various organizations are points at which we have raised legally articul-
able claims and beaten the system at its game. It had no choice but to
bend in these instances.
But this method will not dismantle the master's house because, by
going to the legal system, we use the master's tools. We must throw
down the master's tools and use our own means to raise a challenge to
the patriarchy.
And so while activists in other cities may want to keep their sights
on legal means of achieving recognition for alternative families, we
must go farther. We can take different tacks both inside and outside
the system. Encouraging political candidates to support alternative
family rights when there is constituent support for it will result in get-
ting supporters on the decision-making bodies. For example, Alderper-
son Jim McFarland was elected to the Madison Common Council after
a campaign based on strong support for the alternative families ordi-
nance. After becoming part of the Council, McFarland became one of
the ordinance's chief sponsors and drafted the M.E.O.C. report recom-
mending passage of the ordinance by the Common Council. 156
Additionally, we must take our struggle outside the formal system
and into the streets, homes, workplaces and communities of this soci-
ety. As was seen by the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's
and by the anti-war movement of the 1960's and 1970's, agitating in
the streets of our communities will help spread understanding of, and
support for, a change in society's definition of the family. Numerous
communities around the country already have annual "gay-pride" pa-
rades held in recognition of gay men and lesbians. These parades could
expand their concerns to include a call for recognition of the alternative
families formed by gay men and lesbians. Organizing other supportive
individuals and organizations, such as labor unions, feminists, working
class people, and people of color, could result in other marches and
demonstrations calling for recognition of alternative families. Raising
these issues in our community groups and organizations may lead to
developing support and pressure for a change in alternative families'
status in society.
Those of us who live in alternative families must also embrace
these families, whether nuclear or extended, and tell one another, our
families of origin, and our friends, that this is our family. We must
demand recognition from ourselves and our friends. Only by developing
this self-recognition will we gain the strength and commitment to or-
156. See REPORT OF THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, supra note 44.
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ganize and agitate for recognition from society. As long as we allow
ourselves to feel "less than" traditional families, as long as we reserve
the name "family" for our family of origin and not our family of
choice, we will not have the fortitude necessary for an on-going strug-
gle with the patriarchy.
We must work with our colleagues and co-workers to obtain em-
ployment-based protection and benefits from our employers. We must
talk to each other about the disparity resulting from benefits given to
some families and not others, to some employees and not others, de-
pending on family composition. We must place extension of benefits to
alternative families on our agenda for individual negotiations and col-
lective bargaining.
Through all this, we must mobilize ourselves and our communities
to press for genuine change. For if we do not apply the pressure, we
will not achieve change. The patriarchy will ignore our needs as long as
it is allowed to do so. We cannot obtain change within the system with-
out first organizing, agitating, and creating conditions for change
outside the system. Only by extra-legal, broad-based efforts will we
ever effectively challenge the patriarchy and its legal system to recog-
nize and protect all families, regardless of composition.
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